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SMITH v. DIXON
996 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Kermit Smith was sentenced to death following his conviction of
the December 3, 1980 first-degree murder, second-degree rape, and
common-law robbery of Whelette Collins. After the jury convicted
Smith, the trial court held a sentencing hearing in which it submitted four
aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances for the
jury's consideration. The jury found the existence of all four of the
aggravating circumstances, including that Smith committed the murder
while (1) raping, (2) robbing, and (3) kidnapping Collins, and (4) that the
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."'
Smith appealed his conviction and sentence, but did not challenge
the constitutionality of the heinousness factor. The Supreme Court of
North Carolina affirmed, 2 and the United States Supreme Court denied
Smith's petition for certiorari.
3
Smith's first application for post-conviction relief, in North Caro-
lina superior court, raised for the first time the argument that the statutory
aggravating factor of heinousness was unconstitutionally vague in vio-
lation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the jury was
not charged with a constitutionally acceptable limiting definition of the
factor.4 He also argued that North Carolina's system of appellate review
of death sentences was constitutionally inadequate, and that he had been
denied the right to effective assistance of appellate counsel because his
attorney had failed to advance on direct appeal many of the issues raised
in Smith's Motion forAppropriate Relief(the equivalent ofa state habeas
petition in Virginia).5 Before the State responded to Smith's motion, the
superior court entered an order denying all of Smith's claims. 6 The
1 Regarding the aggravating circumstances, whether the murder
was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel," the court instructed:
Every murder is not especially heinous, it is not atrocious
nor cruel. While every murder, if it results from an unlawful
killing, of course, is a violation of the law, but it does not
necessarily mean that there is anything aggravated about it or
that it was especially heinous or atrocious or cruel. And our
Supreme Court has said that the words "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel" means extremely or especially or particu-
larly heinous or attrocious or cruel. Heinous means extremely
wicked or shockingly evil. Atrocious means marked by or
given to extreme wickedness, brutality or cruelty, marked by
extreme violence or savagely fierce. It means outrageously
wicked and violent. Cruel means designed to inflict a high
degree of pain, utterly indifferent to or the enjoyment of
suffering of others.
Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 670 (4th Cir. 1993).
2 State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264 (N.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982).
3 Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
4 Smith's Motion for Appropriate Relief raised 57 issues, grouped
into five "Claims."
5 Not addressed in this summary are the court's treatments of
Smith's claims under McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)
(holding that North Carolina's death penalty statute, which requires
sentencing jury to find a mitigating factor unanimously before it can
consider that factor, violates Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)),
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (holding that aprosecutor's
argument to a jury at penalty phase, which suggested that the responsi-
bility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rested not
Supreme Court of North Carolina summarily denied Smith's petition for
a writ of certiorari, 7 as did the United States Supreme Court.
8
Smith filed a second Motion for Appropriate Relief in North
Carolina superior court, and again, the superior court denied the motion;
9
the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied certiorari, 10 as did the
Supreme Court of the United States. 11
In May of 1988, Smith filed his habeas corpus petition in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
The district court, in an opinion rendered before the Supreme Court's
decision in Coleman v. Thompson12 concluded that consideration by
a federal court of Smith's claims was not barred by procedural default
because the last state court opinion addressing these claims had not
included a plain statement that it based its decision on state law
grounds. 13 On the merits, the district court found that the heinousness
instruction was unconstitutionally vague under Maynard v.
Cartwright,14 and that Smith was not foreclosed under Teague v.
Lane15 from raising this as error. 16 Further, the court found that the
North Carolina Supreme Court had not cured the vagueness error by
reweighing the evidence or conducting a constitutional harmless-error
analysis. 17 Declining to conduct harmless-error analysis itself, 18 the
district court granted habeas relief, ordering that Smith's death sen-
tence be set aside unless the State retried him within 180 days. 19 The
court then stayed entry of judgment in order to allow the State to
petition the Supreme Court of North Carolina for "further review..
in accordance with Clemons v. Mississippi."20 The Supreme Court of
North Carolina subsequently denied the State's request,2 1 believing
that it lacked jurisdiction, and the district court ordered its prior
on them but with the Mississippi Supreme Court on review, was incon-
sistent with the Eighth Amendment's heightened need for reliability in
the determination that specific death sentences are appropriate), and the
Sixth Amendment (ineffective assistance of counsel and right to cross-
examine), all of which were denied.
6 996 F.2d at 670-71 (citing State v. Smith, Nos. 80 CRS 15265,
15266, 15271 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 19, 1983)).
7 State v. Smith, 333 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1985).
8 Smith v. North Carolina, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
9 State v. Smith, Nos. 80 CRS 15265, 15266, 15271 (N.C. Super.
Ct. Mar. 9, 1987).
10 State v. Smith, 364 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. 1988).
11 Smith v. North Carolina, 485 U.S. 1030 (1988).
12 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991). See case summary of Coleman, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 4 (1991).
13 Smith v. Dixon, 766 F.Supp. 1370, 1376 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
14 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
15 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that a petitioner cannot receive the
retroactive benefit of a decision if such decision establishes a "new rule,"
does not place certain kinds of primary conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe, and is not a rule essential to
the fundamental fairness of the proceeding). (Applied to capital cases in
Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822 (1990). See case summary of Sawyer,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 4 (1990).)
16 Smith, 766 F.Supp. at 1379-86.
17 Id. at 1386.
18 Id. at 1386-96.
19 Smith v. Dixon, No. 88-337 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 1991).
20 Id. See Clemons, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). See also case summary
of Clemons, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1990).
21 State v. Smith, 412 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. 1991).
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decision into effect, granting Smith a new sentencing hearing.
22
Both Smith and the State appealed.
HOLDING
The Court of Appeals held that, because the superior court decision
did not include an adequate statement that its decision rested on a state
procedural bar,23 and because nothing in the surrounding circumstances
indicated that the superior court rested its decision on such a bar,24 the
district court correctly determined that Smith was not procedurally
barred from federal habeas review of his claim challenging the limiting
construction of the "heinousness" factor. On the merits, the State
conceded that the construction was insufficient. Additionally, the court
held that the North Carolina Supreme Court had not cured the vagueness
error,25 and that only the North Carolina Supreme Court could cure the
error in the first instance.
2 6
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
This case highlights the treacherous nature of procedural default in
federal habeas proceedings. It is unusual and noteworthy that a federal
court asked itself whether a habeas petitioner had defaulted his federal
claims at the state level, and answered "no." Here, Smith could have, and
should have, raised his vagueness challenge to the "heinousness" factor
at trial and on direct appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court. Under
North Carolina law, a Motion for Appropriate Relief may be denied when
"upon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to adequately
raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do
so." 27 Smith, by not raising his constitutional challenge in a timely
fashion, provided the superior court with the very grounds upon which
it could deny his petition.
28
Virginia practitioners should note Smith's unique circumstances
and good fortune. Because North Carolina calls an appeal from a denial
of state habeas relief a petition for certiorari, denial of that petition is not
a judgment. Virginia has similar procedure, but the appeal from denial
of state habeas review is called a petition for appeal. If that petition is not
made, the claims denied habeas relief are defaulted. Likewise, if the
Supreme Court of Virginia denies the petition for appeal, the federal
habeas court will look to that denial, which is a judgment, to determine
if denial rests on a procedural bar. Therefore, were Smith a similarly
situated Virginia appellant, his claims would almost certainly have been
defaulted. State supreme courts are typically much better at articulating
the grounds for denial of relief than trial courts are, as was particularly
true of the North Carolina trial court in this case.
22 Smith v. Dixon, No. 88-337 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 1991).
23 Smith, 996 F.2d at 674.
24 Id. at 675.
25 Id. at 676.
26 Id. at 677.
27 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(a)(3) (1983).
28 Though the North Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari
following the superior court's decision on Smith's motion, the Court of
Appeals found that the"last state courtjudgment" for Coleman purposes
is the superior court's denial of the Motion for Appropriate relief, not the
denial of certiorari. 996 F.2d at 672 n.5 (citing Felton v.Barnett, 912F.2d
92,94-95(4th Cir. 1990) (holding that "certiorari is a discretionary form
of review and is not one of right," and "[tihe rules and procedures of the
North Carolina Supreme Court regarding writs of certiorari are substan-
tially similar to those of the United States Supreme Court," i.e., denial of
certiorari is not a "judgment.")).
29 Smith, 996 F.2d at 672. See Caldwell v.Mississippi,472 U.S. 320
(1985).
30 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(b) (1983).
The Smith court noted, however, that it is not enough that the
superior court could have relied on procedural bar; it must have actually
based its decision on procedural bar in order to prevent federal habeas
review.29 Because North Carolina law30 allows a state court to decide
claims on the merits despite the availability of procedural bar, the court
reasoned that Smith's motion could have been procedurally barred or
decided on the merits.
3 1
At this point, a brief history of the law governing federal habeas
review of such state decisions is informative. In Michigan v. Long, the
Supreme Court established a presumption of jurisdiction on direct
review for cases where "the adequacy and independence of any possible
state law ground is not clear."'32 The presumption meant that federal
jurisdiction existed if adequate and independent state grounds for a
decision were not apparent.
33
That presumption was extended to federal habeas review in Harris
v. Reed.34 Harris held that federal habeas review is not barred unless the
state court issues a "plain statement" that its judgment rests on a state
procedural bar.
35
This line ofprecedent was interrupted somewhat disturbingly by the
Supreme Court's decision in Coleman v. Thompson.36 Coleman argued
that the absence of a plain statement of the grounds of his dismissal
triggered the presumption of Long and Harris in favor of federal habeas
review. The Court responded that "[a] predicate to the application of the
Harris presumption is that the decision of the last state court to which the
petitioner presented his federal claims must fairly appear to rest primarily
on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law." 37 No longer was the
test for denial of federal habeas review the presence of a "plain state-
ment" of procedural bar. The Court found that the Virginia supreme
court decision at the bar "fairly appear[ed]" to rest primarily on state
law.38
The Smith court noted this sea change in the law of reviewability of
state-court-denied federal claims. However, it analogizedSmith to a case
previously distinguished from Coleman in which an examination of
circumstances surrounding the last state decision, as undertaken in
Coleman to parse a state law ground for decision, was inconclusive.
39
The Smith majority reasoned that because these circumstances provided
no guidance, and because North Carolina law provided alternative
grounds for the decision, the decision of the North Carolina superior
court fairly appeared to be interwoven with federal law.40 For example,
the majority noted that, "[c]ertainly Smith's challenge to the constitu-
tional adequacy of North Carolina's appellate review of death sentences
... was denied on the merits....,,41 It could not have been defaulted,
the court reasoned, because the first time Smith could raise the issue was
in his habeas petition.42
31 996 F.2d at 672 n.6.
32 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
33 See case summary of Coleman, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4,
No. 1, p. 5 (1991).
34 489 U.S. 255 (1989). Habeas proceedings, like Smith, present a
different question from that decided in Michigan v. Long, though the
clarity of the statement of state law grounds for decisions below is
relevant to both. Federal courts in habeas proceedings havejurisdiction
over defaulted claims. For reasons of comity and federalism, however,
they generally decline to hear them.
35 Id. at 263.
36 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
37 Id. at 2557.
38 Id.
39 Nickerson v. Lee, 971 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1992).
40 996 F.2d at 674.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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The dissent raised an aspect of the default issue which is also
important to Virginia attorneys. Judge Wilkins maintained that Smith
could have raised his claim of denial of meaningful appellate review in
his direct appeal, did not, and should therefore be barred from raising it.
43
This is true with respect to a systemic challenge that the North Carolina
appellate review scheme is flawed, a claim the North Carolina Supreme
Court had often entertained. Such a claim could, and should, be raised
properly on direct appeal. Such a challenge in Virginia is contained in
the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse "Motion to Prevent the Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty," available from the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse, and should be made at trial and on direct appeal.
The Fourth Circuit majority was also correct, however, when it
found that, because Smith could only raise the issue of the state's
appellate review system as it applied to him in collateral proceedings,
after the state supreme court conducted that review, it could not have
been procedurally defaulted on direct appeal. 44
The clear implication is that it is imperative that counsel raise both
a pre-trial constitutional objection to the state appellate scheme as a
whole, and a subsequent objection on habeas against the appellate
process as applied to the defendant, or risk procedural bar at the hands of
dueling interpretations.
In reaching the merits of the State's appeal of the district court's
holding that North Carolina's narrowing construction was infirm, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the State conceded the unconstitutionality of its
construction on appeal. The State claimed that the North Carolina
Supreme Court had saved the sentence, however, on Smith's direct
appeal, by performing harmless-error analysis as required by Clemons
v. Mississippi.45 The court rejected this argument, as the North Carolina
Supreme Court had failed to cite any of its narrowing constructions or
any other case applying North Carolina's narrowed definition,4 6 and had
declined the opportunity to clarify its decision.
In Clemons, the United States Supreme Court held that, upon
invalidation of one aggravating circumstance relied upon by a sentencing
jury, an appellate court in a "weighing" state may salvage the death
sentence by conducting harmless-error analysis or by reweighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 47
43 Id. at 684 n. 3 (Wilkins, C.J., dissenting).
44 996 F.2d at 674.
45 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
46 996 F.2d at 675-76.
47 494 U.S. at 751-52. A "weighing state" is one whose capital
murder statutory scheme specifically and formally requires the sentencer
to weigh the import of the mitigating factors and aggravating factors
found in the penalty phase of the trial in determining whether to impose
the death penalty. Though Virginia's scheme does not employ this
language, it is a de facto "weighing state," because a jury finding the
presence of aggravating factors may disregard them in the face of
mitigating evidence and choose to impose life in prison.
48 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
In Stringer v. Black,48 the Court described the distinction between
"weighing" and "non-weighing" states, and highlighted its importance in
this context. In a non-weighing state, the formal process of determining
the appropriateness of a death sentence is not infected by the presence of
an invalid aggravating factor, so long as the sentencing body finds at least
one other valid factor, as well. However, the Court also stated,
"[a]ssuming a determination by the state appellate court that the
invalid factor would not have made a difference to the jury's
determination, there is no constitutional violation resulting from tile
introduction of the invalid factor in an earlier stage of the proceed-
ings." 49 Thus, Stringer requires at least harmless-error analysis in the
presence of an invalid factor even in non-weighing states such as
Virginia.
In a weighing state, a reviewing court may not assume that it would
have made no difference had the invalid factor not been introduced. The
Supreme Court concluded, "only constitutional harmless-error analysis
or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the
defendant received an individualized sentence." 50
The North Carolina Supreme Court denied the state's petition to
clarify the basis for the decision it entered in Smith. In denying
jurisdiction to hear the matter, the court effectively refused to perform the
analysis required to save the death sentence under Clemons and Stringer.
Though it has not yet been called upon to do so, the Supreme Court of
Virginia may make the same denial of jurisdiction to perform the
requisite analysis. This possibility provides further cause to challenge
the Virginia "vileness" factor in every instance.
Finally, the district court in Smith refused to perform the Clemons
harmless-error analysis itself. Finding the re-weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances to be a question of state law, and therefore
not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, the Fourth Circuit held that
first instance harmless-error review is properly performed in the state
appellate system. 51
Summary and analysis by:
H. Ernest Stone
49 Id. at 1137(emphasis added).
50 Id.
51 996 F.2d at 677. The federal court's refusal to perform harmless-
error review in the first instance is due in part to the Supreme Court's
holding in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). The Brecht
court held that trial-type constitutional errors are subject to a lower
standard of harmless-error analysis on federal habeas review ("actual
prejudice") than on direct state appeal ("harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt"). Thus, the state gets a "better deal" on habeas review than on
direct review. As noted by the Fourth Circuit in Smith, "[the Supreme
Court] intended not to apply the Brecht anomaly in cases tainted by
invalid aggravating factors." 996 F.2d at 677 n. 13.
